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Abstract
Individual retailers may choose to invest in a substitute to a dominant supplier’s
products (inside option) as a way of improving its position towards the supplier.
Given that a large retailer has stronger investment incentives than a smaller rival, the
large retailer may obtain a selective rebate (size-based price discrimination). Yet, we
often observe that suppliers do not price discriminate between retailers that differ in
size. Why is this so? We argue that the explanation may be related to the competitive
pressure among the retailers. The more fiercely the retailers compete, the more each
retailer cares about its relative input prices. Other things equal, this implies that the
retailers will invest more in the substitute the greater the competitive pressure. We
show that if the competitive pressure is sufficiently strong, the supplier can profitably
incentivize the retailer to reduce its investments in substitutes by committing to
charge a uniform input price. Furthermore, we show that under uniform input pricing,
the large retailer may induce smaller rivals to exit the market by strategically under-
investing in inside options.
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1 Introduction
Size-based input price discrimination in favor of large retailers is an age-old issue. Wal-
mart’s success, for instance, has partly been explained by size advantages in input prices
(see e.g. Basker, 2007; Ellickson, 2016; Dukes, Gal-Or and Srinivasan, 2006); a ten percent
increase in volume reduces Walmart’s marginal upstream costs by two percent (Basker,
2007). Likewise, Amazon exploits its power as a large retailer to obtain low input prices
in the book publishing market (Gilbert, 2015). In the US multi-channel TV market, the
per customer input prices for a large firm like Comcast could be 25 percent lower than
those faced by smaller firms (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Doudchenko and Yurukoglu,
2016). The UK competition authorities found a significant negative relationship between
size in grocery retailing and unit input prices (Competition Commission, 2008). In 2019,
the Norwegian Competition Authority (2019) made a comprehensive study of input prices
in the grocery market; from some dominant suppliers, the largest retail chain obtains a
selective rebate of more than 15 percent compared to the smaller rivals.1 These examples
indicate that input price discrimination takes place in a large array of industries. The aim
of this paper is to shed some new light on why suppliers price discriminate, and to analyze
whether it is actually in their interest to do so.
Suppliers cannot price discriminate unless they have some market power, but it is far
from obvious why a supplier with market power should want to let input prices depend on
the size of the respective buyer (hereafter labeled retailer). In the public debate, the typical
story used to explain size-based input price discrimination is that it is more costly for the
supplier to lose a contract with a large retailer than with a small retailer.2 This strengthens
the bargaining position of large retailers. The problem with this story, is that it neglects
the fact that it is also more costly for a large than for a small retailer to lose the contract
with the supplier. This strengthens the bargaining position of the supplier towards large
1The Norwegian Competition Authority (2019) confirms that the revealed price discrimination favored
the largest chain on the margin, and the competition authority has started an investigation towards the
largest chain and two dominant suppliers. Analogously, the investigation of the UK grocery market by
the Competition Commission (2008, Appendix 5.3) found that ”an increase in the volumes purchased by
a retailer or wholesaler is associated with a reduction in both the unit and net price paid.”
2This claim was given support by Galbraith’s concept of countervailing buyer power (Galbraith, 1952).
However, Galbraith offers no formal model, and Stigler (1954) was criticizing Galbraith for formulating a
dogma rather than a theory. See also von Ungern-Sternberg (1996).
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retailers. Katz (1987) shows that these effects exactly offset each other whenever size is
the only difference between the retailers; there will be no price discrimination.3
Having established this, Katz (1987) then assumes that large retailers have better ac-
cess to an alternative source of supply than do small retailers; if this is the case, price
discrimination might evolve in favor of large retailers.4 Put differently, size-based input
price discrimination arises if there are transactional economies of scale, such that a large
retailer’s threat to leave (completely or partly) is stronger than that of smaller retailers. To
prove this formally, Katz (1987) considers a game where the supplier at stage one sets input
prices. At stage two, each retailer either accepts the input price he is offered or invests in
an alternative source of supply. This constitutes an outside option since the retailers have
not made any investments at the time when input prices are determined. The greater the
retailer’s output, the better it will be able to cover the investment costs. To prevent the
retailers from making such investments, the supplier charges lower input prices from large
than from small retailers. If the retailers compete in the output market, the large retailers
will gain a competitive advantage due to their lower input prices.
In this setting, the supplier will lose profit if it does not price discriminate. To see
why, assume that the supplier is obliged by law to charge a common uniform price from
all retailers. The fact that the supplier then cannot provide selective rebates to large
retailers does not remove the large retailers’ threats of investing in the outside option. On
the contrary, the threats become stronger; the supplier cannot favor large retailers with
lower input prices than those offered to their competitors. To keep all retailers aboard,
the supplier must therefore reduce all input prices – even those paid by the largest buyers.
This in turn translates into lower consumer prices, but the supplier is clearly harmed.
Katz (1987) obviously captures important aspects of the relationship between retailers
and suppliers. However, there is reason to question the robustness of the prediction that a
supplier necessarily prefers to price discriminate. As an example, we observe that digital
3Katz (1987) assumes that the supplier can make take-it-or-leave-it offers. Inderst and Montez (2019)
and Foros, Kind and Shaffer (2018) verify that the result holds also if input prices are determined through
bargaining processes between the supplier and each retailer.
4Large retailers may also achieve a rebate compared to smaller ones if the supplier faces increasing
marginal costs in the relevant area (Chipty and Snyder, 1999 and subsequent papers). More precisely, in
the set-up of Chipty and Snyder (1999), the larger retailer realizes a size advantage given that the gross
surplus function created by the transaction between the supplier and the retailer is concave.
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platforms like Apple and Google commit to a non-discriminatory 30/70 split of revenues
with content providers.5 Moreover, in both digital and more traditional markets, most-
favored customer clauses are regularly used between suppliers and retailers. This has the
effect of ensuring that small and large buyers pay identical input prices. Could commitment
to uniform pricing be an optimal strategy for a supplier if transactional economies of scale
would otherwise generate price discrimination?
The answer is yes. To show this, we set up a truly simple model where a retailer prior
to the determination of the dominant supplier’s input prices, may choose to invest in an
alternative source of supply, which for concreteness we may call a private label. The more
the retailer invests, the lower the marginal cost of producing the private label. In the words
of O’Brien (2014), the retailer has an inside option (as opposed to an outside option as in
Katz) which it may use to press down the input price charged by the supplier. Now, suppose
that there are several retailers and that the consumers perceive them as close substitutes.
The retailers then compete fiercely, and it is important for each to gain a competitive
advantage over its rivals. This business-stealing motivation results in high investments in
the inside option, which is bad for the supplier, who is forced to set low input prices. So,
what would happen if the supplier could commit to charging the same input price from
all retailers (i.e. uniform pricing)? No retailer can then obtain a competitive advantage
by putting pressure on the supplier’s input price. The retailers’ investment incentives are
consequently reduced, and the supplier can increase input prices. Thus, it is profitable
for the supplier to commit to uniform pricing, but since higher input prices translate into
higher retail prices, the consumers will be harmed.
It is not always profitable for the supplier to commit to uniform pricing. This is most
clearly seen if we assume that the retailers do not compete at all; there is then no business-
stealing motivation of investing in the inside option, and the investment level of the largest
retailer will then be independent of whether the supplier price discriminates. If the supplier
uses uniform pricing in such a case, the only effect will be that it must charge lower input
prices from smaller retailers, which clearly would harm the supplier, but be advantageous
for the consumers. This result holds also if the competitive pressure between the retailers
5Apple uses this split independent of whether the decision on retail pricing is delegated (the agency
model used for e-books and apps) or whether Apple decides the retail price (the wholesale model used for
music in iTunes). See e.g. Gilbert (2015) and Foros, Kind and Shaffer (2017).
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is relatively weak. Consequently, the supplier and the consumers have conflicting interests
both with weak and strong retail competition. Interestingly, though, we find that if the
competitive pressure is neither particularly weak nor particularly strong, both the supplier
and the consumers prefer uniform pricing.
In the spirit of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), and subsequent papers on strategic
R&D investments, we allow for investment spillovers between the retailers. We show that if
the supplier price discriminates, and the investment spillover is not too strong, each retailer
will strategically over-invest in the inside option to gain a competitive advantage. Under
uniform pricing, on the other hand, retailers will under-invest in inside options in order to
constrain output and increase prices.
We apply our findings to consider how a large retailer may induce exit (or prevent entry)
of smaller rivals. The concern that input price discrimination causes exit and prevents entry
goes back to the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936. We find that if the supplier commits to
uniform pricing, the large retailer may induce exit by under-investing in the inside option.6
The opposite is true under price discrimination unless investment spillovers are sufficiently
strong.
2 Literature review
As explained above, in contrast to our model, the source of size-based price discrimination
in the seminal paper by Katz (1987) is that outside options are available after the input
prices are determined. Under uniform pricing, the supplier cannot provide a selective rebate
to the large retailer, but the large retailer’s bargaining power from the threat of using the
outside option does not disappear. Consequently, the supplier offers a lower input price to
all retailers to ensure that the large retailer stays on board.7 Consumer prices are reduced.
6Doudchenko and Yurukoglu (2016) empirically quantify how bargaining power related to size affects
the analysis of mergers and the profitability of entrants in the US multi-channel TV market. As mentioned
above, they estimate that Comcast manages to negotiate about 25 percent lower unit input prices for
content than smaller rivals.
7In the basic model, Katz assumes that only the large retailer can invest in the outside option, but in
the appendix, he shows that the results hold also when the small retailers can invest in outside options.
Katz considers the case where the retailers need to undertake a fixed cost investment to get access to
the outside option. The qualitative results are not affected if the retailers instead make investments that
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Since no investments take place, total welfare unambiguously increases if the supplier uses
uniform pricing. However, since the supplier is worse off under uniform pricing, the supplier
does not want to commit to uniform pricing under binding outside options.
O’Brien (2014) and Akgün and Chioveanu (2019) assume that price discrimination
arises due to asymmetries in inside options among the retailers. O’Brien shows that average
input prices are typically higher if the supplier cannot use price discrimination. In this case,
consumer surplus tends to be higher under price discrimination (in contrast to Katz, 1987).
Akgün and Chioveanu (2019) have a model with the same basic mechanisms as ours, but
they do not consider differences in size between retailers. Their focus is on how a ban on
price discrimination affects retailers’ innovation incentives, and whether such a ban tends to
favor more efficient or more inefficient retailers. They do not consider investment spillovers
or whether retailers have incentives to over-invest or under-invest in inside options (e.g.
private labels).
We deliberately assume that retailers are equally efficient at the retail level. Conse-
quently, differences in retail marginal costs are not a source of price discrimination in our
model. All other things equal, a retailer with lower marginal costs at the retail level has
a larger market share than a less efficient rival. However, such asymmetries in retail effi-
ciency cannot explain size-based price discrimination in favor of the large retailer. Quite
the opposite; DeGraba (1990) and Katz (1987) show that an unconstrained supplier will
price discriminate in favor of the less efficient retailer.8 If the retailers can invest prior to
the decision on input prices to reduce retail marginal costs, DeGraba (1990) shows that
retailers invest less under price discrimination than under uniform pricing. The reason is
that the more a retailer invests in retail marginal cost reductions, the greater the level of
price discrimination in disfavor of the more efficient, and consequently larger, retailer.
Inderst and Valletti (2009) combine elements from DeGraba (1990) and Katz (1987).
Like DeGraba, they allow retailers to invest in retail marginal cost reductions prior to the
supplier’s choice of input prices. Like in Katz, retailers may invest in an outside option after
reduce the marginal costs. The latter reflects our model, but where we switch the timing; investments are
made after the decision on input prices. See Appendix A.4.
8Dukes, Gal-Or and Srinivasan (2006) show the opposite in a bargaining framework. If a large retailer
has lower retail marginal costs, there is a potential gain from transferring sales to the more efficient retailer,
thus increasing channel profit. Under bargaining, the supplier captures some of the gain from enhanced
efficiency.
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input prices are determined, and the threat of using the outside option is more credible
for a large than for a small retailer. In contrast to DeGraba (1990), Inderst and Valletti
(2009) show that retailers may invest more in retail marginal cost reductions under price
discrimination than under uniform pricing.
Like all the above-mentioned papers, we consider linear input pricing. While real-world
contracts typically involve more than a simple unit input price, linear input pricing seems to
be a more reasonable assumption than non-linear contracts in many markets. One example
is grocery retailing. Even though the contracts between suppliers and retailers are complex,
comprehensive investigations by competition authorities in the UK and Norway (Compe-
tition Commission, 2008; Norwegian Competition Authority, 2019) reveal that rebates are
given at the margin and that (average) variable input price components are decreasing
in size (see also discussion by Inderst and Valletti, 2009). Linear input price contracts
are also widely used in cable-TV markets (Crawford and Yurukoglu, 2012; Crawford et
al., 2018; Doudchenko and Yurukoglu, 2016) and in the book publishing industry (see e.g.
Gilbert, 2015). Further examples are provided by Gaudin (2019). Iyer and Villas-Boas
(2003) provide a theoretical rationale for using linear input pricing.9
3 The model
We consider a context with n ≥ 2 intrinsically identical and independent local markets. In
each market there is a ‘small’ retailer, S, which only operates locally (nS = 1). In nL ≤ n
of the markets there also exists a ‘large’ retailer, L. The large retailer has one outlet in
each of the markets where it is present. We assume that nL ≥ 2.
A dominant upstream supplier U offers each retailer a good that it can resell to the
9Under non-linear pricing it is crucial whether wholesale contracts are secret or not. Under secret con-
tracts, O’Brien and Shaffer (1992; 1994) show that there will be no price discrimination at the margin from
an unconstrained supplier. Instead, input prices at the margin equal the supplier’s marginal cost. In con-
trast to the outcome under non-linear pricing, Gaudin (2019) shows consumer prices may be higher under
secret than observable (and credible) linear input prices. Most of the papers on input price discrimination
under non-linear contracts assume an unconstrained supplier. One exception is Inderst and Shaffer (2019).
They show that if retailers have access to outside options, the supplier may reduce the unit input price,
and increase the fixed slotting fee, towards one of the retailers, and thereby reduce the value of the outside
options for all other retailers.
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consumers. If retailer i buys the good, it is charged a unit input price wi (i = L, S) by
the supplier. Retailers are equally efficient with respect to retail costs. For simplicity, we
normalize retailing costs to zero. Hence, asymmetries in retailing costs are not a source of
input price discrimination in our model. Operating profit per retail outlet is then equal to
(pi − wi)qi, where pi is the consumer price and qi is output.
Rather than buy from the supplier, retailer i can produce a substitutable good in-house
if it has previously made an adequate investment: in the words of O’Brien (2014), the
retailer has an inside option. Let oi denote the marginal cost of producing this inside option.
The more the retailer has invested in the manufacturing process, the lower its marginal
production cost oi.
10 In the spirit of the seminal paper by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin
(1988) on strategic R&D investments, we open up for the possibility that a retailer which
invests in the production of an inside option, may generate positive side effects for the
other retailer in the same market (e.g., due to knowledge spillovers concerning production
technologies or – in a richer model – greater acceptance of e.g. private labels).
Hence, we assume that the marginal cost of producing the inside option is
oi = 1− (xi + θxj) , where i, j = L, S; i 6= j. (1)
The parameter θ ∈ [0, 1] in equation (1) reflects investment spillovers. There are no
spillovers if θ = 0, and perfect spillovers if θ = 1.11
10As emphasized in the Literature Review, retailers’ investment in reducing the cost of using an alter-
native to the supplier is also analyzed by Akgün and Chioveanu (2019). More specifically, Akgün and
Chioveanu (2019) assume that the alternative is offered by competitive fringe supply, where retailers may
invest in own assets specific to the alternative input. In grocery markets, among others, one interpretation
may be investments in the ability to offer private labels. We could also envisage that each retailer makes
investments that increase the consumers’ willingness to pay for the private label (e.g., through marketing
and quality improvements). The model becomes rather complex if we consider both cost-reducing and
value-enhancing investments. To make our points as transparent as possible, we abstract from the latter
and assume that the consumers perceive the inside option to be equally good as the original good offered
by the dominant supplier.
11In (1) we have implicitly that the spillovers to the large retailer are independent of how many local
markets it operates in. This seems technically reasonable, since the local retailers are identical and conse-
quently make identical technological choices. An alternative specification of the spillover function would
be to set oL = 1 − (xL + θnLxS) . This would presumably enhance the advantage of operating in several
locations (greater economies of scale), but not change the qualitative results.
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The cost of investing xi is C(xi), where C is strictly increasing and strictly convex.
Since the inside option and the original good are perfect substitutes, retailer i will sell the
one which has the lower marginal cost. Defining zi = min {wi, oi}, we can write net profit
of a representative small retailer and the large retailer, respectively, as
πS = (pS − zS)qS − C(xS) and (2)
ΠL =
nL∑
(pL − zL)qL − C(xL). (3)
In each local market, consumer preferences are defined by a Shubik-Levitan (1980)
utility function:12





where s ∈ [0, 1] reflects the degree of differentiation between the outlets. Specifically, the
consumers perceive the large and the small retailers in a given market as perfect substitutes
if s = 1 and as unrelated if s = 0. By allowing imperfect substitutes, s ∈ (0, 1), we analyze
a greater variety of market competition than most existing literature.
Consumer surplus in a representative market is given by
CS = Ψ(qL, qS)− pLqL − pSqS. (5)
Solving ∂CS/∂qi = 0, we find the inverse demand functions
pi = 2− (1− s)2qi − s(qL + qS). (6)
Below, we consider a game with the following timing in each of the n identical markets:
• Stage 1: The retailers decide how much to invest in the inside option (L and S choose
xL and xS, respectively). This determines oL and oS.
• Stage 2: The supplier sets the input prices wL and wS that maximize own profit,
taking into account the fact that retailer i = L, S will buy the good only if wi ≤ oi.
12The demand system by Shubik and Levitan (1980) has an attractive property, since we may vary the
degree of substitution among retailers without affecting the size of the market (see e.g. discussion by
Inderst and Shaffer, 2019).
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• Stage 3: L and S decide qL and qS, where their marginal costs are given by zL =
min {wL, oL} and zS = min {wS, oS}, respectively.
The game is solved by backward induction.
3.1 Stage 3: Output.
At stage 3, the retailers choose their profit-maximizing output. Solving ∂πi/∂qi = 0, the






qi + (pi − zi) = 0. (7)
This implies that
qi =
2 (4− 3s)− 2 (2− s) zi + szj
(4− s) (4− 3s)
. (8)
3.2 Stage 2: The supplier chooses input prices.
At stage 2, the supplier offers retailer i the upstream good at price wi. We normalize all
costs for the upstream firm to zero, so that its profit level is given by:
u = wLqL + wSqS. (9)




wL = wS = ŵ = 1.
Our interest is in the case where retailer i has invested in an adequate inside option,
such that oi < ŵ. This means that retailer i
′s cost of using the inside option is a binding
constraint for the upstream firm; the retailer will not buy from the supplier unless wi ≤
oi < ŵ.
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3.3 Stage 1: Investments by the retailers.
Let us now turn to stage 1, where the retailers decide how much to invest in the inside

























The first square bracket of equation (10) measures the direct effect of investing in the
inside option. The term (−qSdzS/dxS) captures the fact that by increasing xS by one
unit, the production cost for the inside good falls by dzS/dxS units for each of the qS
units the retailer sells. Other things equal, it is optimal to invest in the inside option until
this marginal benefit is equal to marginal investment costs, C ′(xS). The second square
bracket measures the strategic effect of investing in the inside option: since an increase in
xS reduces marginal production costs for the small retailer, the large retailer will respond
by changing its output (dqL/dxS). This, in turn, affects the price that the small retailer can
charge (∂pS/∂qL < 0). Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988), we say
that the small retailer will strategically over-invest if the second square bracket is positive
(which is true if dqL/dxS < 0), while it will strategically under-invest if the bracket is
negative (which is true if dqL/dxS > 0). We will analyze this in detail below.


























Investing in more efficient production technology is like obtaining a non-rival good for
the large retailer; it benefits from lower marginal costs in all the locations in which it
operates. Both the direct and the strategic effect of investing are therefore greater for the
large retailer than for each of the small retailers, other things equal.
All markets are identical, and it is convenient to define the large retailer’s profit in each
market where it operates as πL = ΠL/nL. This allows us to write the first-order condition
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= 0, (i = L, S), (12)
where ni = 1 for i = S and ni = nL for i = L. Below, we will discuss when this first-order
condition constitutes an optimum.
3.3.1 Input price discrimination (PD)
Let us start out by asking whether the supplier has incentives to price discriminate, i.e.
to charge different prices from the large and the small retailers. To answer this question,
we can use equation (12) to see how the investment incentives for the large and the small


















Equation (13) shows that the larger is the large retailer, the more it invests in the inside
good. The size of the large retailer does not directly affect the investment incentives of the
small retailers, but it could, nonetheless, have an indirect effect. However, stability requires
that |dxi/dxj| < 1. Since lower costs of producing the inside good force the upstream firm
to charge a lower price for the original good, we can conclude:
Lemma 1 Suppose that the supplier can price discriminate:
(i) The supplier charges a higher input price from the small retailers than from the large
retailer (zS > zL), and
(ii) more so the larger the size difference between the retailers (d(zS − dzL)/dnL > 0).
The mechanism behind the result in the first part of Lemma 1 corresponds to Akgün
and Chioveanu (2019). They show that a retailer with lower marginal cost of using the
inside option, faces a lower input price. O’Brien (2014) shows in a bargaining framework
that a retailer with better inside options than its rival, obtains a lower input price, but
O’Brien does not model how asymmetries in inside options may arise. We show that this
effect follows from exogenous differences in size between the retailers. Therefore, the ability
to invest in inside options may explain size-based input price discrimination in favor of the
12
large retailer, and that the degree of price discrimination is increasing in the size difference
between the retailers.
While market players and policy makers often claim that input price discrimination is
size-based, the literature only provides economies of scale with respect to outside options
(Katz, 1987) and increasing marginal costs at the supplier level (Chipty and Snyder, 1999)
as potential explanations for size-based price discrimination. Long-run investment in inside
options may be an alternative explanation, and seems to be consistent with the observations
that retailers in many industries undertake significant cost-reducing and value-enhancing
investments regarding the ability to provide private labels and backward integrate (for
further discussion, see the Concluding Remarks).
Let us now investigate how the investment incentives depend on the investment spillovers.













dxi︸ ︷︷ ︸ .
>0 if θ>0
(14)
The more firm i invests in the inside option, the lower its marginal costs (dzi/dxi = −1).
Other things equal, an increase in xi thus makes the local rival less competitive and induces
it to produce less. This is captured by the first term in equation (14), which is consequently
negative. However, if there are positive investment spillovers, a higher investment by firm
i reduces marginal costs also for firm j (dzj/dxi = −θ). In isolation, this tends to increase
output from firm j, making the second term in equation (14) positive if θ > 0. Using










, where θPD ≡ s
4− 2s
. (15)
If the spillovers are sufficiently strong, θ > θPD, we consequently see that firm j’s
output is increasing in the investment level of firm i. Using equation (6), which implies
that ∂pi/∂qj = −s (the negative price effect of greater output from the rival is larger the
better substitutes the retailers sell), it follows that the sign of the strategic effect depends












qi < 0 if θ > θ
PD. (16)
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Let us next investigate how one retailer’s investment incentives depend on the invest-





4 (2− s)2 (4− 2s− sθ)




> 0 if θ > θPD, (17)
which shows that investments are strategic complements if θ > θPD and strategic substi-
tutes if θ < θPD.
We can now state:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the supplier price discriminates, and that
(i) θ < θPD. Each retailer will strategically over-invest in the inside option. Investments
are strategic substitutes.
(ii) θ > θPD. Each retailer will strategically under-invest in the inside option. Invest-
ments are strategic complements.
Figure 1 shows how the sign of the strategic effect depends on spillovers and the substi-
tutability between the large and the small retailer in each market. Each retailer wants the
rival to produce less. In the figure, this implies that each retailer will over-invest below the
upward-sloping line (dqj/dxi|θ<θPD < 0) and under-invest above it (dqj/dxi|θ>θPD > 0).
Figure 1: Strategic investment behavior.
Equation (13) tells us that an increase in nL has a positive effect on xL, but only an
indirect effect on xS. The sign of the indirect effect depends on the size of the spillovers,
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which determines whether investments are strategic substitutes or strategic complements.
More precisely, from Proposition 2, we can deduce:
Corollary 1 The small retailers’ investment in inside options is
a) decreasing in the size of the large retailer (dxS/dnL < 0) if θ < θ
PD.
b) increasing in the size of the large retailer (dxS/dnL > 0) if θ > θ
PD.
3.3.2 Uniform pricing (UP)
Now, assume that the upstream supplier does not price discriminate between the large and
the small retailers, but rather sets a common wL = wS = w. At this stage, we will not
discuss why it sets a uniform price; it could be due to competition policy. However, we
shall also see that the supplier may be better off if it does not price discriminate.
It follows from the analysis above that the large retailer has stronger incentives than the
small ones to invest in the inside option (this is true independent of whether the supplier
price discriminates). The supplier will therefore be able to sell to both types of retailers
only if it sets w ≤ oL. In an equilibrium where the supplier serves the whole market, we
therefore have
w = 1− (xL + θxS). (18)
Inserting for this into (8), output at stage three can be written as




The marginal direct benefit for the large firm of investing in the inside option is the
same as when the supplier price discriminates; it reduces the per-unit input price from the
supplier by one unit (dwi/dxL = −1). The disadvantage for the large retailer is that the
lower input price now also applies for each of the local rivals, which respond by increasing
output (dqS/dxL = 1/(4 − s)). The large retailer will therefore strategically under-invest.


































Since ∂πS/∂xS|xS=0 = θqS
2(2−s)
4−s − C
′ > 0 if C ′(0) is not too steep, it is optimal for the
small retailers to invest if θ > 0 (for simplicity, we have assumed that there are no fixed
costs involved in investing in the inside option). The small retailers have no incentives to















In contrast to what we found under price discrimination, investments are now always
strategic complements.
We can conclude:
Proposition 2 Assume uniform pricing and that θ > 0. All retailers will strategically
under-invest in inside options. Investments are strategic complements.
4 Comparison of input price discrimination and uni-
form pricing
4.1 Inducing exit (or preventing entry)
So far, we have looked at the question of whether the retailers have incentives to over-invest
or under-invest in the inside option, given that the rival(s) will remain in the market.
In the public debate, much attention has been given to the question of whether price
discrimination in favor of large retailers prevents entry or, analogously, induces exit of
smaller rivals. In our framework, will the large retailer have incentives to strategically
over-invest in the inside option in order to reduce the profitability of the small retailers
(this could induce exit if the retailers e.g. have fixed operating costs that they need to
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cover)? To answer this question, we must examine how the large retailer’s investment level
affects profit for a small rival (i.e. not only the large retailer’s own profit, which we looked
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The more the large retailer invests in the inside option, the more it will sell (because
the supplier will be forced to charge a lower input price). This will harm the small retailers
if s > 0, and explains why the first term in the square bracket of equation (20) is negative.
The second term, however, is positive if there are positive spillovers, such that the small
retailers’ marginal costs are decreasing in the large retailer’s investment level. Whether the











If θ < θPD, we thus have dπS
dxL
< 0. In this case, the large retailer can induce exit or
prevent entry by over-investing in the inside option.
If the supplier does not price discriminate, higher investments by the large retailer will




If the large retailer wants to induce exit under uniform pricing, it will therefore under-
invest in inside options.
We can state:
Proposition 3 Under uniform pricing, the large retailer may induce exit (prevent entry)
by under-investing in the inside option. The opposite is true under price discrimination,
unless spillovers are sufficiently strong (θ > θPD).
4.2 Who benefits from uniform pricing (and who benefits from
price discrimination)?
Henceforth, we abstract from entry and exit decisions, and we ask who is better off under
price discrimination and who is better off under uniform pricing? We show that the degree
of competition among retailers has critical impact on the answer to this question.
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If there are perfect spillovers (θ = 1), the costs of using the inside option will be the same
for all the retailers. Then, their investment levels do not depend on whether the supplier in
principle is able to price discriminate; the uniform pricing and price discrimination regimes
are identical. In the rest of this paper, we will focus on the opposite extreme, and set θ = 0.
We will then analyze how the differences between the price discrimination and the uniform
pricing regimes depend on the competitive pressure among the retailers, as measured by the
substitutability parameter s. In order to obtain closed-form solutions, we further assume
the simple quadratic investment cost function, C(xi) = (γ/2)x
2
i . Our interest is in stable
equilibria where both the large and the small retailers are operative and, in Appendix A.1,
we show that all the necessary conditions for the existence of such equilibria are satisfied
if γ ≥ 8 and nL < 6. We therefore set C(xi) = 4x2i and let nL ∈ [2, 6).
4.2.1 Consumers perceive the retailers as perfect substitutes (s = 1)
As a starting point, assume that the consumers perceive the large and the small retailers
to be perfect substitutes (s = 1). The large retailer invests more in the inside option than
any of its competitors, and will therefore be charged a lower input price by the supplier if







; wPDS − wPDL > 0. (21)
All calculations in this section are shown in Appendix A.2. The more outlets the large
retailer has, the more it will invest in the inside option and the less will it be charged by
the supplier (dwPDL /dnL < 0). This means that the competitiveness of the small retailers
is decreasing in nL, so that their marginal profitability of investing in the inside option
is also decreasing in nL. This, in turn, allows the supplier to charge them an input price
which is increasing in nL (dw
PD
S /dnL > 0).







=> πPDS − πPDL < 0. (22)
Since the input price for the large retailer is decreasing in its number of outlets, its
profit level is increasing in nL (dπ
PD
L /dnL > 0), while the opposite is true for the small
retailers (dπPDS /dnL < 0). Not surprisingly, profit per outlet is greater for the large than
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for the small retailers. We further find that consumer surplus and the profit level for the





60 (6− nL) (17− nL)
(96− 11nL)2
. (23)
Equation (23) implies that dCSPD/dnL > 0 and du
PD/dnL < 0. This simply reflects
the fact that the direct effect of the large retailer increasing its size is that the supplier is
forced to charge a lower input price to the large retailer, which partly spills over to lower
consumer prices from the large retailer. This effect dominates over the indirect effect that
the small retailers can be charged a somewhat higher input price if nL increases (so that
consumer prices from the small retailers increase).





As expected, we find dwUP/dnL < 0; the large retailer invests more in the inside option
the more locations it operates in, and thereby forcing the supplier to charge a lower price.
In Appendix A.2, we show that joint profit for the nL outlets of the large retailer is
greater than the profit level of a representative local competitor (nLπ
UP
L − πUPS > 0).
However, an interesting difference from the price discrimination case is that since the small
retailers can now free-ride on the investments undertaken by the large retailer, the large











It is straight forward to show that wPDL < w
UP < wPDS ; the uniform input price lies
between the low input price that the large retailer would otherwise pay and the high
input price faced by the local retailers. This corresponds to the findings by Akgün and
Chioveanu (2019).13 The large retailer will consequently have to pay a higher input price
under uniform pricing, and its competitive advantage over the small retailers erodes. For
the same reason, a uniform price is unambiguously good for the small retailers; they will
become more competitive, and also pay a lower input price.
13As emphasized above, they do not consider differences in size among the retailers, but assume that
one of the retailers may be more efficient with respect to investments in inside alternatives.
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In parallel to the results above, we have dCSUP/dnL > 0 and du
UP/dnL < 0. More
interestingly, from equations (23) and (26), we find that uUP > uPD. The supplier is thus
better off if it charges the same price from each of the retailers than if it price discriminates.
The difference is, moreover, increasing in nL. The intuition for why it is advantageous for
the supplier not to price discriminate, is that the large retailer will then have less incentives
to invest in the inside option, since it cannot obtain any competitive advantage. The
supplier can therefore charge a higher input price from the large retailer under uniform
pricing than under price discrimination (wUP > wPDL ). The higher input price is partly
passed on to the consumers, and from equations (23) and (26), it follows that CSUP <
CSPD.
Other things equal, it is a dominant strategy for the supplier to price discriminate at
stage two of the game if the retailers differ in their investments in inside options. Unless
the supplier can credibly commit to uniform pricing before the retailers invest, we will
therefore have a unique equilibrium where the supplier price discriminates.
Proposition 4 Assume that the consumers perceive the large retailer and the small retail-
ers as perfect substitutes. The supplier will then commit to uniform pricing if it is able to
do so, and this will harm the consumers.
As discussed in the Introduction, competition policy might require dominant suppliers
to not price discriminate. This could solve the commitment problem for the supplier.
Indeed, even if competition authorities do not actively pursue the non-discrimination policy,
one might imagine that the supplier could appeal to the competition law to signal that it
cannot price discriminate. An alternative device for committing to uniform pricing, is
through a price-parity clause with at least one of the retailers in each market. When
retailers’ products are perfect substitutes, both the supplier and the small retailers in each
market prefer uniform pricing. Consequently, they all benefit from such a clause.
It is interesting to compare the results above with those of Katz (1987), who assumes
s = 1. A retailer can credibly threaten to ex post invest in an outside option (e.g. backward
integration) unless the supplier charges a sufficiently low input price. As in our model, a
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large retailer has greater incentives than smaller retailers to invest in an alternative source
of supply due to economies of scale. Katz derives conditions under which none of the firms
will actually invest in the outside option. He finds that under reasonable assumptions,
uniform pricing (e.g. due to a ban on price discrimination) can lower the input prices that
the supplier charges from both the large and the small retailers. Consumer prices will then
unambiguously fall, in contrast to what we find.
Before we leave the comparison with Katz (1987) for now, we note that welfare under
price discrimination and welfare under uniform pricing in our case are given by, respectively,
W PD =






It can be shown that WUP > W PD in the relevant area (2 ≤ nL < 6); total welfare is
higher under uniform pricing than under price discrimination. The difference is, moreover,
increasing in nL, as shown in Figure 2. Consequently, a ban on price discrimination is
arguably beneficial both in Katz’s and our context, albeit for very different reasons. In
Katz (1987) a ban is welfare improving because a threat of investing in an outside option
forces the supplier to charge lower input prices. However, no investments actually take
place in the equilibrium Katz analyzes. In contrast, in our model at least the large firm
will make investments, but this will be in inside options that are not used per se; it invests
to press down the price of the good it actually sells in equilibrium. In this sense, investments
constitute a negative welfare effect.
Figure 2: Welfare higher under uniform pricing than under price discrimination ( s = 1).
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4.2.2 Consumers perceive the retailers as unrelated (s = 0)
With s = 0, there is no competition between the retailers. Clearly, also in this case each
of the local retailers invests less than the large retailer. They will therefore be charged
a higher input price and be less profitable than the large retailer (all calculations in this







;wPDS − wPDL > 0 and πPDS − πPDL < 0. (28)
Turning to the regime with uniform pricing, note that since there is no retail competi-
tion, the large retailer’s investment level is independent of which prices the small retailers
charge. The supplier will consequently not be able to sell to the large retailer if it charges
more than wPDL . Clearly, it does not want to charge a lower price either, so in equilibrium,
we have
wUP = wPDL = 2
16− nL
32− nL
< wPDS . (29)
With s = 0, price discrimination thus harms the small retailers, but has no effect on
the large retailer.
The fact that the small retailers can free-ride on investments by the large retailer,
implies that we also now find that the profit level per outlet is highest for the former,
πUPS > π
UP
L . It is nonetheless still true that nLπ
UP
L − πUPS > 0.
Since the small retailers pay lower input prices with uniform pricing than with price
discrimination, while the input price for the large retailer is independent of the price regime,
it immediately follows that uniform pricing harms the supplier and benefits consumers who
buy from the small retailers. More precisely, we have
uUP−uPD = −16 (16 + 15nL)
961 (nL − 32)2
(nL − 1) < 0, CSUP−CSPD =
64 (63− nL)
961 (32− nL)2
(nL − 1) > 0.
We can now state:
Proposition 5 Assume that the consumers perceive the large retailer and the small retail-
ers as unrelated (independent in demand). The supplier will price discriminate if it is able
to do so, and this will harm the consumers.
Finally, note that the loss in market power for the supplier implies that the dead-weight
loss falls. Since the small retailers moreover save investments, welfare is necessarily highest
under uniform pricing. As for s = 1, the welfare gain of uniform pricing is increasing in
nL.
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4.2.3 Retailers are imperfect substitutes (0 < s < 1)
The analysis above indicates that the supplier prefers uniform pricing if the competitive
pressure between the stores is sufficiently strong (i.e., for sufficiently high values of s), while
the opposite is true for the consumers. This is illustrated graphically in Figure 3 (for nL =
2). If it is observed that suppliers commit to uniform pricing (e.g., price-parity clauses)
or appeal to the competition law to justify non-discrimination, policy makers should thus
be skeptical. If suppliers appear to be negative to uniform pricing, on the other hand, we
have an indication that uniform pricing would benefit the consumers. However, signals
from suppliers should be interpreted with caution, since they can clearly have incentives to
mislead policy makers.14
Figure 3: Consequences of price parity for the supplier and for the consumers.
5 Concluding remarks
We show how investments in inside options may give rise to size-based input price dis-
crimination. The important distinction between outside and inside options is whether the
14According to our analyses, the arguments for allowing price discrimination is stronger if policy makers
care about consumer surplus rather than about total welfare (i.e., if they abstract from the resource costs of
higher investments in inside options). Katz (1987) focuses on the case where retailers credibly threaten to
invest in an outside option, but where the outside options will not be used in equilibrium since the supplier
responds by reducing input prices. In his framework (where it is assumed that the stores are perceived as
perfect substitutes), a ban on price discrimination is therefore welfare improving if it increases consumer
surplus.
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investments take place before or after the supplier’s decision on input prices. This distinc-
tion may have crucial impact on suppliers’ incentives to price discriminate. In practice,
retailers may improve their position towards suppliers through investments ex ante the
negotiation with suppliers, as well as through a credible threat of switching to an outside
option ex post of the negotiations.
Let us further discuss our applications from the Introduction; the grocery market, the
book publishing market, and the multi-channel TV market. In grocery retailing, private la-
bels may constitute an alternative source of supply. For many products, retailers probably
need to make significant investments prior to negotiations over input prices with the brand
suppliers to have a credible threat from private labels. If retailers decide to backward inte-
grate and switch to a private label, they probably need to undertake further investments.
With respect to investments in private labels, there may also be significant investment
spillovers that retailers need to consider. If one retailer succeeds in introducing a private
label in one product category, this will probably make it easier for a rival retailer to do the
same.15
Amazon obtains low input prices from suppliers (publishers) due to its size.16 Gilbert
(2015, page 174) argues that an important part of Amazon’s position is that they have a
credible threat to backward integrate: “Publishers have the additional concern that they
will become an antiquated and redundant component of the book industry as Amazon
increasingly deals directly with authors to supply books. Publishers fear that Amazon will
‘disintermediate’ the supply chain, replacing the traditional role of publishers to source and
distribute content.” This example illustrates that Amazon’s credible threat comes from a
combination of inside and outside options. Amazon undertakes investments into backward
integration (Amazon Publishing) which proves their ability to switch to an alternative
source of supply.
In the multi-channel TV market, a large player like Comcast, with its 23 million sub-
scribers, has a size advantage over smaller rivals, such as Google Fiber and Cablevision,
15Market shares of private labels differ between markets, but inside market differences among competing
retailers are smaller.
16Gilbert (2015, page 173) writes “Amazon could seek to exploit its power as a large buyer to obtain low
wholesale prices, rebates, or other concessions from its suppliers, and a credible concern is that Amazon
will continue to press its suppliers for better terms. Publishers complain that at Amazon, today’s wholesale
price is the starting point for tomorrow’s negotiations.”
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when it comes to using an alternative source of supply through backward integration into
content programming. Doudchenko and Yurukoglu (2016) refer to the fact that Google
Fiber emphasizes that they face a significant disadvantage due to size-based input price
discrimination in favor of larger rivals such as Comcast. This certainly indicates that trans-
actional economies of scale are needed to have a credible size advantage. In general, Google
is one of the largest firms in the world. By the same token, the buyer group of smaller cable
TV firms (the National Cable Television Cooperative) fails to achieve size-based rebates,
since they cannot coordinate backward integration on behalf of their members (Doudchenko
and Yurukoglu, 2016). Also in this example it seems reasonable that cable-TV providers
need to make investments prior to the negotiations over content input prices in order to
credibly threaten to – overnight – go to an alternative source of supply. Nonetheless, it
will involve further costs if they put their threat into action.
It is obviously a question of to which extent a supplier can commit to uniform pricing.
In our model, if the supplier cannot commit to uniform pricing, it will provide a selective
rebate to the large retailer. In several markets, we observe that firms that control wholesale
terms of trade may commit to non-discriminatory rules. In other markets, we observe that
firms are lobbying for non-discriminatory obligations, such as net-neutrality. Indeed, even
if competition authorities do not actively pursue the non-discrimination policy, one might
imagine that the supplier could appeal to the competition law to signal that it cannot price
discriminate.
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A Appendix
A.1 Existence of stable equilibria
In this appendix, we show the necessary conditions for the existence of stable equilibria
where both the large and the small retailers are operative. It suffices to show this for s = 1,
since the requirement will be stricter than with any lower value of s.








i . The stable equilibrium must satisfy the following two conditions:
1. The second-order condition: d2πi/dx
2
i < 0, and
2. Stability: |dxi/dxj| < 1.
For i = L, we have that the second-order condition d2πL/dx
2
L = −(9γ − 8nL)/9nL < 0
holds if γ ≥ 8nL
9
, and that the stability condition |dxL/dxS| = −4nL/(9γ − 8nL) < 1 is
satisfied for γ ≥ 4nL/3. The latter is the stricter requirement that ensures the existence of
stable equilibria.
Restricting our attention to the cases where nL < 6, we must have that γ ≥ 8 to ensure
stable equilibria.
A.2 Consumers perceive the retailers as perfect substitutes (s =
1)
In this appendix, we demonstrate all calculations that are presented in section 4.2.1, where
consumers perceive the firms as perfect substitutes, s = 1. The model,including the timing
of the game, is presented in section 3. The game is solved by backwards induction.
Stage-three output is solved in equation (8). At the second stage, the supplier sets the
input prices that maximize their own profits given that the retailer will only buy the good
if wi ≤ oi. In equilibrium, this will be binding, such that zi = oi. Therefore, we insert
equation (1) into equation (8), to find the stage-two output
qi =
1− xj + 2xi
3
. (A.1)
Stage 1: Optimal investments Moving to the first stage of the model, we distinguish
between the two potential pricing regimes: input price discrimination and uniform pricing.
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Input price discrimination At the first stage, retailer i solves ∂πi/∂xi = 0, and we


















From the optimal investment levels in (A.2) and (A.3), we then obtain the values of the
input prices (as given in section 4.2.1):
wPDL = 1− xPDL = 16
6− nL
96− 11nL




This implies that wPDS − wPDL = 696−11nL (nL − 1) > 0, which means that there is input
price discrimination in favor of the large retailer, such that the small retailer pays a higher
input price.






Once we have found the optimal investments in (A.2) and (A.3), and the input prices
in (A.4), the subsequent expressions in section 4.2.1 follow directly.
Inserting (A.2) into (3), we obtain the profit of the large and the small retailer, respec-
tively, given by the expressions in (22).
Combining (A.2) and (A.3) with (5) and (9), we find consumer surplus and the supplier’s
profit, respectively, as given in equation (23).
From equation (22), we find that the large retailer obtains a higher profit than the small
retailer
πPDS − πPDL = −
4 (63− 8nL)
(96− 11nL)2
(nL − 1) < 0. (A.5)
Using equation (22), we find that dπPDL /dnL = 100
11nL−102
(11nL−96)3





From equation (23), we find that dCSPD/dnL = 900
nL−11
(11nL−96)3




Total welfare is the sum of retail profits, supplier profit and consumer surplus:
W PD = CSPD + uPD + πPDL + π
PD
S =
10 (1035− 226nL + 11n2L)
(96− 11nL)2
. (A.6)
Uniform pricing Suppose next that the supplier does not price discriminate, and
offers both retailers the same, uniform, input price w.
When there is no price discrimination, the supplier must give all retailers the same
take-it-or-leave-it offer. The supplier will be able to sell to both types of retailers only if
it sets w ≤ oL (i.e., the large retailer’s integration constraint binds for both retailers). In
equilibrium, we find that the input price is
w = 1− xL. (A.7)




and xUPS = 0. (A.8)
It then follows directly from (A.7) that wUP = 1−xUPL = 218−nL36−nL (equivalent to equation
21). Comparing this with (A.4), we see directly that wPDL < w
UP < wPDS .
We find that dwUP/dnL = − 36(nL−36)2 < 0; the large retailer invests more in the inside
option the more locations it operates in, and this forces the supplier to charge a lower price.
By inserting (A.8) into equations (2) and (3), we obtain the retailers’ profits under
uniform pricing as given by equation (25).
Equation (25) states that the small retailer receives a higher profit than the large retailer
under uniform pricing. However, the joint profit for all nL < 6 outlets is greater than the
small retailer’s profits: nLπ
UP
L − πUPS = − 4nL(nL−36)(n
2
L − 36nL + 36) > 0.
Combining (A.8) and equations (5) and (9), gives us the consumer surplus under uniform
pricing and the supplier’s profit, in equation (26).





Comparing (23) and (26), we find that
CSUP − CSPD = 288
(36− nL)2






uUP − uPD = − 1
(nL − 36)2




Thus, the consumers prefer price discrimination, whereas the supplier prefers uniform
pricing when consumers perceive the retailers as perfect substitutes.
Finally, total welfare is






Comparing (A.6) and (A.9), we find that
WUP −W PD = − 1
(nL − 36)2
(52nL − 1440)
(110nL − 2260nL + 10350)
(11nL − 96) > 0.
Hence, in terms of total welfare, uniform pricing is preferred when consumers perceive
the retailers as perfect substitutes.
A.3 Consumers perceive the retailers as unrelated (s = 0)
In this appendix, we demonstrate all calculations that are presented in section 4.2.2, where
consumers perceive the firms as unrelated, s = 0. We proceed as we did in Appendix A.2,
and demonstrate all the calculations in section 4.2.2. As above, output at the third stage
is given by equation (8). We distinguish between the two potential pricing regimes, input
price discrimination and uniform pricing.
Input price discrimination (s = 0) We regard the case where zi = oi binds at the
second stage. Inserting equation (1) into equation (8), assuming θ = 0 and s = 0, we have













By inserting (A.11) into equation (1), we find the optimal input prices given by equation
(28). The local (small) retailer is charged more than the large retailer:
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wPDS − wPDL =
32
31 (32− nL)
(nL − 1) > 0. (A.12)







This implies that πPDS − πPDL = − 431(32−nL) (nL − 1) > 0.
Combining (A.11) with (5) and (9), we obtain the consumer surplus and the profit for
the supplier, respectively:
CSPD =
64 (1985− 64nL + n2L)
961 (32− nL)2
and uPD =
16 (30 736− 1921nL + 15n2L)
961 (32− nL)2
. (A.13)
Total welfare is the sum of retail profits, supplier profit and the consumer surplus:
W PD =
4
961 (nL − 32)2
(
107n2L − 11 653nL + 217 200
)
. (A.14)
Uniform pricing (s = 0) Suppose next that the supplier does not price discriminate,
and offers both retailers the same, uniform, input price w.
At stage three, the retailers choose quantities. Solving ∂πi/∂qi = 0, we find optimal





At the second stage, the input price will be determined by the large retailer’s invest-
ments, such that
w = oL = 1− xL. (A.15)




;xUPS = 0. (A.16)















> 0. However, the joint operating profit of the large retailer exceeds the
operating profit of the small competitor, nLπ
UP
L − πUPS = − 4(nL−32)2)(n
2
L − 32nL + 32) > 0.
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Comparing (A.17) and (A.13), we find that
uUP − uPD = −16 (16 + 15nL)
961 (nL − 32)2
(nL − 1) < 0
and
CSUP − CSPD = 64 (63− nL)
961 (32− nL)2
(nL − 1) > 0.
By comparing the results of price discrimination and uniform pricing, we now see that
the consumers prefer uniform pricing, whereas the supplier prefers price discrimination.
Both of these results are opposite from when consumers perceive the retailers as perfect
substitutes (s = 1).
Total welfare under uniform pricing is the sum of retail profits, supplier profit and
consumer surplus:





(224− 9nL) . (A.18)
Comparing (A.14) and (A.18), we find that uniform pricing is always preferred, in terms
of total welfare, WUP −W PD = − 4
961(nL−32)2
(107n2L − 3004nL + 1936) > 0.
A.4 Investment in marginal-cost reduction in outside options
In this appendix, we show (as promised in footnote 7) that the qualitative results of Katz
(1987) are not affected if the retailers make investments that reduce the marginal costs
rather than the fixed costs, to get access to the alternative source of supply. This reflects
our model, but where we switch the timing; investments are made after the decision on
input prices. The timing of the game is as follows (note that the order of stages one and
two is switched from our model):
• Stage 1: The supplier sets input prices wL and wS that maximize own profit, taking
into account that retailer i = L, S will buy the good only if the retailer’s profit
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from buying from the supplier (no integration) exceeds the profit from backwards
integration (πNIi ≥ πIi ).
• Stage 2: The retailers decide how much to invest in the inside option (L and S
choose xL and xS, respectively). This determines oL and oS. The retailers accept
the supplier’s offer, or reject it and invest in marginal-cost reductions in the outside
option.
• Stage 3: The retailers compete à la Cournot; L and S decide qL and qS, where their
marginal costs are given by zL = min{wL, oL} and zS = min{wS, oS}, respectively.
The game is solved by backwards induction.
Stage 3: Cournot (s = 1) The basic set-up for the model, including the third stage of
the game, is given in the main text. For the purpose of this appendix, we assume θ = 0
and s = 1.
Stage-three outputs are solved in equation (8):
qi =
2− zj − 2zi
3
(A.19)
where zi = min{wi, oi}.
A.4.1 Discriminatory pricing
Stage 2: Investments At the second stage, the retailers face two sourcing alternatives.
First, the retailers can buy the product directly from the supplier (and make no invest-
ments, i.e. no integration). Then, we set zi = wi and xi = 0 for all i. The non-integration
profit (superscript ‘NI’) becomes
πNIi =
(2 + wj − 2wi)2
9
. (A.20)
The second alternative is to acquire the product from an alternative source (integrate
backwards), such that zi = oi = 1 − xi. Then, the integration profit (superscript ‘I’)
becomes
πIi =























Inserting the optimal investments into equation (A.21) yields the integration profit for








Stage 1: Supplier chooses input prices At the first stage, the supplier chooses input
prices. The supplier maximizes profits, such that the retailers are indifferent between
buying from the supplier, and acquiring the product elsewhere. It follows that (A.20) must
equal (A.22), and we solve for wi and find the best-response functions (in Katz’s words:
the integration frontier):









From the best-response functions, we find that the integration frontier is upward sloping
(∂wL(wS)/∂wS = 1/2 > 0), similar to Katz (1987).
We solve the two best-response functions simultaneously, and find optimal input prices











S), and we have input price discrimination in
favor of the large retailer. In equilibrium, the retailers will not make any investments, such
that xi = 0 for all i = L, S. Inserting (A.23) into (A.20), retailer profits from buying from
the supplier (no integration) are πPDL = 100
9−nL
(11nL−96)2





A.4.2 Uniform pricing (zi = w)
Stage 2: Optimal investments Suppose now that the supplier only offers one uniform
price to the retailers, such that zi = w. Again, the retailer has two sourcing alternatives.
It can buy from the supplier, for which zi = w and xi = 0 for all i. Then, non-integration





Alternatively, it can integrate backwards into supply and use an outside option, in which
case zi = oi = 1−xL. This means that the input price is determined by the large retailer’s







Taking the derivative of equation (A.25) with respect to investments xi, ∂πi/∂xi = 0,
yields the optimal investment levels xUPL =
nL
36−nL
and xUPS = 0. We observe that x
UP
L <









Stage 1: Supplier chooses input prices At the first stage, the supplier chooses in-
put prices, such that the retailers are indifferent between buying from the supplier, and
acquiring the product elsewhere. It follows that (A.24) must equal (A.26), and solve for a
common wUP :










. Thus, the supplier
offers a uniform input price to all retailers that is lower than the average prices charged
under price discrimination. This corresponds to Katz’s Lemmas 1 and A.1. Hence, the
qualitative results of Katz (1987) are the same whether we consider fixed-cost investments
or marginal-cost reducing investments.
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